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Abstract
Certain types of expenditure--e.g. mortgage interest and medical insurance--receive
favorable tax treatment and are effectively subsidized relative to other (non-tax-favored)
expenditures.  Labor taxes (e.g. income taxes) can therefore produce efficiency losses by
distorting the allocation of consumption, in addition to distorting the labor market.  Using
evidence on the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in tax rates, a seminal study by
Feldstein (1999) estimates that the marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB) could exceed
unity, when the effects of tax deductions are taken into account.  This is several times larger
than in previous studies of the MEB that focus exclusively on labor market effects.
This paper develops a "disaggregated" approach to estimating the MEB that
decomposes welfare impacts in the market for labor and tax-favored consumption goods, and
uses micro evidence on labor supply elasticities, the demand elasticity for mortgage interest,
medical insurance, and so on.  Based on Monte Carlo simulations, we find a 68 percent
probability that the MEB lies between .31 and .48 for government transfer spending and
between .21 and .35 for public goods.  These estimates are below Feldstein's, but are still
considerably higher (70 percent or more) than when we ignore tax deductions.
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TAX DEDUCTIONS, CONSUMPTION DISTORTIONS,
AND THE MARGINAL EXCESS BURDEN OF TAXATION
Ian W. H. Parry*
1.   INTRODUCTION
Public expenditure programs on defense, education, medical care, assistance for the
poor, pensions, crime prevention, and so on, obviously produce potentially important benefits
for society.  But these programs also entail social costs and--at least on the criterion of
economic efficiency--additional spending on any of these programs is worthwhile only if the
social benefits that are generated exceed the extra social costs.  Economists have long
recognized that the social costs of public spending include not only the opportunity costs of
the resources involved, but also the resulting deadweight loss from higher distortionary taxes
that are necessary to finance the spending (Pigou, 1947; Harberger, 1964; Browning, 1976).1
This paper is about the estimation of these deadweight losses for the US economy.
Over the years a number of studies have attempted to estimate the marginal excess
burden of taxation (MEB).2  This is the efficiency loss from the increase in distortionary taxes
necessary to raise an extra dollar of tax revenue.  Traditionally, studies have focussed on the
efficiency impact of the tax increase in factor markets alone, particularly the labor market.
Estimates of the MEB vary a lot due, among other things, to different assumptions about
relevant elasticities, which tax is being increased, and what the extra spending is used for.
But a central estimate from this literature for the MEB of labor taxation, when the dollar is
returned to households in a transfer payment, is about 25 cents.3
However, some very recent studies have emphasized that the tax system distorts not
only factor markets, but also the allocation of spending among different types of consumption,
saving, and investment.  This is because certain types of expenditures, such as mortgage
                                               
* Fellow, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Resources for the Future.  The author is grateful to Antonio
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assistance.  Correspondence to: Ian Parry, Resources for the Future, 1616 P Street, Washington, D.C. 20036.
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1 More generally, extra spending can be financed by cutting back other spending programs, or by increasing
borrowing.  In the latter case, tax increases are effectively delayed until a future period.  We focus purely on the
case when spending is financed from current taxes.
2 This is sometimes referred to as the marginal welfare cost of taxation.  A related concept is the marginal cost
of public funds which we discuss below.
3 Notable contributions that employ static models include Ballard (1990), Browning (1976, 1987, 1994),
Mayshar (1991), Stuart (1984), and Wildasin (1984).  Ballard et al. (1985) presents results from a dynamic
computable general equilibrium model that allows for tax increases on both labor and capital (see footnote 31
below).  Snow and Warren (1996) and Fullerton (1991) attempt to reconcile the variation in estimates across
different studies.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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interest, employer-provided medical insurance and other fringe benefits, pension and
charitable contributions, interest on local government bonds, and so on, receive favorable tax
treatment, and therefore are effectively subsidized relative to other types of spending.
Increasing the rates of existing taxes may therefore produce efficiency losses not only by
increasing tax distortions in factor markets, but also by increasing subsidy distortions for tax-
favored expenditures.
The recent studies have attempted to estimate the tax income elasticity (TIE).  This
elasticity captures the effect of changes in marginal income tax rates on reducing peoples'
reported taxable income, both through reducing labor supply and by substituting tax-favored
spending for non tax-favored expenditure.  Initially, estimates for the TIE using 1980's data
were quite high--typically greater than one (e.g. Feldstein, 1995; Lindsey, 1987).  An
important paper by Feldstein (1999) demonstrates that such high elasticities would imply
dramatically larger values for the MEB, well above one dollar for transfer spending.  This is a
very striking result: it would imply that the social benefits of (marginal) public spending may
have to exceed two dollars per dollar of extra spending in order to be justified on the grounds
of economic efficiency!  More recent studies using 1990's data, however, point towards
somewhat smaller values for the TIE (see e.g. Auten and Carroll, 1998; Carroll, 1998a),
implying the MEB might be closer to 0.5 than unity.4
There are important advantages to using estimates of the TIE to infer the MEB.  In
particular, this approach minimizes information requirements because it involves the
estimation of a single elasticity that summarizes a whole host of substitution possibilities for
avoiding taxes.  On the other hand, there are a number of respects in which the TIE literature
is preliminary at this stage.
First, the studies typically estimate the TIE by comparing the changes in taxable
income across taxpayer groups whose marginal tax rates were changed by different amounts
following tax legislation.  This "differences in differences" approach is designed to control for
non-tax factors (e.g. business cycle effects) that have a proportional effect on the taxable
income of all groups during the period before and after the tax legislation.  However, this
method does not control for factors that affect income inequality.  In periods of increasing
income inequality, such as the 1980s and 1990s, when marginal tax rates for higher income
groups fall (rise) relative to those for other groups, comparing the change in taxable income of
these groups can produce estimates of the TIE that are biased upwards (downwards).  Since
the 1986 Tax Reform Act reduced marginal tax rates, while the 1990 and 1993 Budget
Agreements increased them, studies using 1980's data may overstate the TIE, while studies
using 1990's data may understate it.
                                               
4 This is based on my own rough calculations, using estimates of the TIE in Carroll (1998b), Table 1.  In
addition to its use in project evaluation, the MEB is also a crucial determinant of the welfare effects of tax shifts
(i.e. simultaneous changes in different tax rates that keep the overall level of tax revenue the same).  For a
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Second, what matters for the MEB is the long run equilibrium responses to changes in
tax rates.  The short run responses that are often the focus of the econometric studies may be
more pronounced than the long run changes due to transitory shifts in taxable income.  For
example, people may temporarily postpone selling stocks in anticipation of lower capital
gains taxation, thereby exaggerating the increase in taxable income before and after a tax
reduction.  In other respects the short run response may understate the long run response.  For
example, the full effects of changes in the effective tax-subsidy for mortgage interest on the
stock of owner occupied housing may occur with a considerable lag.
Third, in practice the price distortions in the markets for tax-favored consumption
goods often depend on a number of other factors besides the subsidy from federal tax
provisions.  For example, future income from pension accumulations is subject to taxation
that offsets the subsidy for current, tax-deductible contributions, at least to some extent.  More
spending on charities may increase rather than reduce welfare if there are significant
beneficial externalities.  Economic efficiency in the housing market is affected by property
taxes, housing assistance programs, external benefits and costs, and so on.  These other types
of pre-existing "distortions" are not taken into account when (unadjusted) estimates of the TIE
are used to calculate the MEB.
In addition the studies focus on the behavior of subgroups of taxpayers rather than the
behavior of all actual and potential taxpayers.  These subgroups usually consist of higher
income taxpayers that generally itemize deductions and therefore may be more responsive to
tax changes than the average taxpayer.  Some studies are based on the tax returns of married
couples which may display a relatively high sensitivity to tax changes--for example, most of
the responsiveness of labor supply comes from the participation decision of married (female)
workers rather than the overtime behavior of non-married workers.  Finally, to date studies
have estimated only the compensated TIE.  However, estimating the MEB for different types
of public expenditure, and particularly public goods, can also require estimates of
uncompensated price effects (see below).5
Many of these limitations should be overcome, at least to some extent, as econometric
studies of the TIE are refined over time.  However, particularly while there is still significant
uncertainty over the TIE, it seems worthwhile to make use of other evidence that can be
helpful in gauging the magnitude of the MEB.  In this paper we present a "disaggregated"
approach to estimating the MEB in the presence of tax deductions.  This involves adding up
the welfare impacts of tax increases in the labor market and the markets for individual tax-
favored goods.  One virtue of this approach is that it makes transparent the potential
contribution of underlying parameters to the MEB--e.g. the demand elasticity for medical
insurance, the magnitude of the assumed pre-existing distortion in the housing sector--which
are not revealed in the TIE studies.  Unfortunately, there is uncertainty about the values of
these underlying parameters, and therefore we would not necessarily claim that our approach
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yields more accurate calculations of the MEB than those based on estimates of the TIE.
Nonetheless, it is still helpful to explore the consistency between estimates of the MEB based
on the TIE, with estimates based on micro evidence about underlying parameters.
We begin in the next section by deriving formulas for the MEB in the presence of tax
deductions, under alternative assumptions concerning the disposition of government revenues.
Our analysis is static--as in Feldstein (1999)--and captures the impact of the tax system on
distorting the labor/leisure decision and the choice among consumption goods.  This provides
conservative estimates of the MEB (though how conservative is unclear), since we do not
capture the impact of the tax system on distorting the consumption/savings decision and the
choice among different types of investment.  Thus, we do not model tax deductions for
pension contributions, accelerated depreciation, and so on.
Section 3 presents calculations of the MEB based on what we believe are plausible
parameter values.  In the absence of tax deductions (i.e. focussing on efficiency impacts in the
labor market alone) the MEB for government transfer payments ranges from 0.1 to 0.42, with
a central value of 0.22.6  Incorporating tax deductions, the range becomes 0.15 to 0.92, with a
central value of 0.39.  For individual deductions to make much difference to the MEB the tax
expenditure involved must be significant relative to aggregate labor tax revenues, and they
must be applied to spending that exhibits a fair amount of price sensitivity.  The huge bulk of
the increase in the MEB is due to welfare impacts in the housing and medical insurance
markets alone.
Clearly, this is a wide range of possible outcomes for the MEB.  We perform Monte
Carlo experiments to try and narrow the range and perhaps make the results more useful for
project evaluation.  According to these results, we find a 68 percent probability that the MEB
for transfer spending lies between 0.31 and 0.48.  These results clearly underscore Feldstein's
original insights about the importance of tax deductions--for example our central estimate is
77 percent higher when we include tax deductions.  However, our estimates are lower than in
Feldstein (1999), partly because we exclude certain deductions from our analysis that do not
directly distort the consumption bundle.
For public goods (that are separable in the utility function) our central estimate for the
MEB increases from 0.13 to 0.27 when we allow for tax deductions.  Our Monte Carlo
simulations suggest a 68 percent probability that the MEB for public goods lies between 0.21
and 0.35.  These numbers are lower than for transfer spending, due to the familiar income
effects than dampen the change in labor supply (see below).  However, they are well above 0
unlike in some other studies that do not take account of tax deductions (see Ballard and
Fullerton, 1992, for a good discussion).
In section 4 we briefly discuss the literature on distortions in tax-favored sectors
(externalities, other regulations, etc.).  These sources of non-tax distortion are sometimes
offsetting and are generally difficult to quantify.  Although we exclude most of these factors,
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consumption/savings decision, and the choice among different consumption and different
investment goods, across all future periods.  Thus, this extension would add considerable
complexity (see e.g. the modeling of capital taxes in Lucas, 1990).  We assume that the
marginal product of labor in each industry is constant, hence supply curves are perfectly
elastic.  We choose units to imply producer prices and a gross wage (or value marginal
product) equal to unity.  For the moment, the only sources of market distortion in the
economy are assumed to be those created by the tax system.9
In addition to providing the public good, the government also provides a lump-sum
transfer of G
T to households.10  Public spending is financed by a proportional tax of t percent
on labor income (as discussed in Section 3 we believe this is not such a restrictive
assumption).  However, each of the xi goods is at least partially deductible from the labor tax.
We define si(t) as the effective tax-subsidy for these goods, that is, the reduction in tax
payments that would result from substituting a dollar of spending on xi for a dollar of
spending on ordinary consumption Y. si(t) < t when xi is not fully deductible from all labor
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that is, spending on the public good and the transfer payment equals labor tax revenues net of
the sum of tax deductions.  We assume the government budget constraint must always balance
(there is no possibility of public borrowing in a static model).
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That is, spending on consumer goods equals net-of-tax labor income plus the government
transfer, where consumer prices equal producer prices less the rate of tax-subsidy.  The
household utility maximization problem is defined by:
                                               
9 We abstract from non-tax distortions in the labor market created by minimum wage laws, trade unions,
information asymmetries, and so on.  The aggregate distortionary impact of these factors may be significant, but
for the U.S. is still likely to be small relative to the wedge that taxes drive between demand and supply prices in
the labor market.  For some discussion of how interactions between taxes and non-tax factors in the labor market
affect the MEB see Browning (1994).  Also, we do not consider how the administrative and compliance costs of
raising revenue may affect the MEB.  On this see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996).
10 As already mentioned G
T can approximately represent social security benefits, educational and medical
expenditures, etc.  Again, we abstract from possible feedback effects of this spending on labor supply (e.g. in
practice social security payments can influence labor force participation decisions since 65-70 year olds must be
non-workers in order to receive them).Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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Finally, we note that 1 + MEB
P is equivalent to the commonly used marginal cost of
public funds.  This is simply the full cost of incremental spending on public goods, which is
the resource value of a dollar plus the incremental efficiency loss from higher taxes necessary
to raise an extra dollar of revenue.
3.   ESTIMATING THE MEB
In this section we discuss plausible parameter values and what they imply for our
definitions of the MEB.  We also present Monte Carlo simulations to indicate "most likely"
outcomes from our range of possible values for the MEB.
A.   Parameter Values
Labor supply elasticities
In our highly aggregated model, the labor supply response to changes in the net-of-tax
wage reflects the impact on average hours per worker and the impact on the participation rate
averaged across all members (male and female) of the labor force.  There is a sizeable literature
on labor supply elasticities for the United States (see e.g. the review in Killingsworth (1983))
and we do not go into the details here.  Based on a recent survey of labor economists' views by
Fuchs et al. (1998), we choose central values of 0.2 and 0.35 for the (economy-wide)
uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticities respectively, and plausible ranges for
these elasticities of 0.1-0.3 and 0.2-0.5.16  Note that there is a fair amount of uncertainty over
these important parameters.
Labor tax rate
The calculation of the labor tax rate is a little involved, and we provide more details in
the Appendix.  We assume a central value of 36 percent for the labor tax, which we arrived at
as follows.  We estimate the average rate of labor tax, which is relevant for the labor force
participation decision, at 33 percent for 1995 (see Appendix).  The contribution of various
taxes is as follows: federal income taxes 12.7 percent, state income taxes 3.0 percent, payroll
taxes 10.8 percent, and sales and excise taxes 6.7 percent.17  The marginal rate of labor tax
                                               
16 These values are from Table 2 in Fuchs et al., assuming a weight of 0.6 and 0.4 for the male and female
elasticities respectively.  Taking labor supply elasticities averaged over all workers (rather than, for example,
male workers only), more or less rules out the possibility of a negative uncompensated elasticity.  The labor
supply estimates reported in Fuchs et al. may understate the overall change in effective labor supply to some
extent since they do not take account of the potential for lower net-of-tax wages to discourage effort on the job,
or induce long run changes in occupational choice.  In comparing our estimates of the MEB to those from
computable general equilibrium models (e.g. Stuart, 1984; Ballard et al., 1985), it is noteworthy that the latter
models often assume significantly higher values for the compensated labor supply elasticity (see the discussion
in Browning, 1987, footnote 9).
17 It is standard in the literature to assume in static models that sales and excise taxes are effectively borne by
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affects the amount of hours per worker over a year (overtime, willingness to take a second
job, etc.) and we assume a value of 41 percent for the typical worker (see Appendix).  Since
roughly two thirds of the estimated labor supply responses come from changes in participation
rates and one third from changes in average hours (see e.g. Russek, 1996), we attached
weights of two thirds and one third for the average and marginal rate of tax, respectively, to
obtain our value of 36 percent.18
This value is below labor tax rates assumed in most other studies of the MEB--for
example Ballard (1990) and Stewart (1984) used 40 percent and Browning (1987) assumed a
central value of 43 percent.  The differences between these tax rates may seem small, but they
imply noticeably different values for the MEB.  We prefer the lower value for two reasons.
First, other studies use marginal tax rates, rather than a weighted average of marginal and
average tax rates; thus they implicitly attribute all of the labor supply response to changes in
hours per worker and none to the participation decision.  Second, other studies often assume
all social security payments are effective taxes (though Feldstein, 1999, is a noticeable
exception).  In practice, workers do gain some offsetting benefits from these taxes in terms of
future social security benefits in retirement--although expected benefits are typically lower
than they would be if workers could invest social security contributions in private capital
markets.  Our figure includes an assumption that the effective burden of (non-Medicare)
social security taxes is 30 percent lower than current tax payments due to future benefits,
though there is much controversy surrounding this issue.19
Given the controversy about effective payroll taxes, variability in tax revenues over
the business cycle, and allowing for measurement errors, it is appropriate to consider a range
of values for labor tax rates.  We assume a range of 32 to 40 percent.
                                               
18 To incorporate a non-proportional labor tax in our model (i.e. to have separate rates for average and marginal
taxes) would require separating out the participation and hours worked decision.  We think that the costs of this
extra complexity probably outweigh any benefits from slightly more accurate estimates of the MEB.  Other
models do not decompose these two dimensions of labor supply either, and implicitly assume that the marginal
rate of tax is relevant for determining the participation as well as the hours worked decision.  In this respect they
overstate the MEB to some extent.
    Other models allow for the possibility that increases in the labor tax may be progressive (i.e. they increase the
marginal rate of tax by more than the average rate), while our analysis is limited to proportional changes in taxes.
This may not be a major drawback however, given that, as already explained, two thirds of the labor supply
response is governed by the increase in average rate of labor tax and only one third depends on the increase in
marginal rate of tax.
19 This is because the link between future benefits and current payments is complicated by Social Security rules.
For example, benefits are based on the 35 years of highest earnings, so that people under 30 may receive no
benefits for their current contributions.  If 65-70 year olds decide to continue working they forgo benefit
payments.  Benefits may be linked to a spouse's earnings, therefore someone may receive no benefits from their
own contributions.  In addition, there is uncertainty over the amount of social security taxes that will be raised
from future workers to pay for the retirement benefits of current workers.  See Feldstein and Samwick (1992) for
a good discussion of these issues.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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taxes, .41.27  In contrast, if wage income is spent on housing rather than ordinary
consumption, only income and sales taxes are avoided.  The tax subsidy in this case is the
marginal income tax rate plus the sales and excise tax rate, .31 (see the discussion of
marginal tax rates in the Appendix).
Certain sector-specific tax provisions further complicate the wedge between the
supply and demand price in the housing market (we discuss non-tax distortions in Section 4).
In particular, property taxes are levied on the value of the housing stock.  Based on the
literature (see e.g. Oates, 1994) our view of the efficiency impact of this tax is as follows.
Differences in average property tax rates between jurisdictions are reflected in differences in
the value of local services (e.g. schools, parks).  To this extent, higher property tax rates are
essentially a user fee for higher quality local services and, roughly speaking, are not
distortionary.  Within a jurisdiction however, buying a larger house leads to higher property
tax payments but no change in the value of local services for that individual household.  To
this extent, higher property taxes distort the choice between housing and other consumption
goods.  In our central case we assume that 75 percent of the variation in property tax rates is
between jurisdictions and 25 percent within jurisdictions.  However, property tax payments
are also deductible from personal income taxes and are therefore subsidized at about 25
percent.  In our central case therefore, these two effects are completely offsetting.  More
generally, if we assume, say, that 0 percent and 50 percent of the property tax is assumed to
be a tax on the consumption of housing services, this would alter our central estimate for the
tax-subsidy by – 0.6 (see Appendix).
Housing also receives favorable tax treatment through exemptions for the imputed
income from owner occupation and capital gains on house sales (e.g. when people move to
more expensive homes).  These provisions distort the choice between housing and other
investment goods, but not the choice between housing and other consumption goods.28
Therefore they are not applicable for our static analysis.  To allow for uncertainty over the
distortionary effect of the property tax and other factors, we consider a wide range of values
for the pre-existing subsidy distortion in the housing market.
B.   Results
Table 2 presents calculations of the MEB based on equations (2.14) and (2.14¢) and
using the above parameter values.  To compare with earlier studies, we begin in the third
column by setting the demand elasticity for tax-favored goods equal to zero, which eliminates
the effect of tax deductions.  Thus, accounting for distortionary impacts in the labor market
alone, our central values for the MEB would be 0.22 for government transfers and 0.13 for
                                               
27 This estimate is similar to that obtained by Phelps (1983).
28 That is, if people invested in other physical capital they would effectively pay taxes on the income earned by that
asset and any capital gains realized from selling the asset.  In contrast, there are no analogous taxes on consumption
goods.  The subsidies from the exemptions for imputed income and capital gains are respectively about one half and
one third the size of the mortgage interest subsidy (based on Table 1 and Nakagami and Pereira, 1996).Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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public goods.  The smaller value in the latter case reflects the fact that the labor supply
response to higher taxes is weaker, because this effect is uncompensated.  Even ignoring tax
deductions there is considerable variability in the MEB under alternative assumptions about
labor tax rates and labor supply elasticities: the MEB for transfers varies between 0.10 and
0.42 and for the public good between 0.05 and 0.25.  Our central estimate for the MEB for
transfer payments is somewhat below Browning (1987)'s central estimate of 0.30, mainly
because, as discussed above, we use a lower tax rate.29
Table 2.  Calculations of the MEB
(a) For Transfer Payments
demand elasticity for, and share of, tax-favored consumption
Labor tax rate labor supply
elasticity
0 low medium high
low .10 .15 .22 .35
medium .18 .25 .34 .49 0.32
high .27 .37 .47 .65
low .12 .17 .25 .38
0.36 medium .22 .30 .39 .56
high .34 .45 .56 .77
low .14 .20 .28 .42
0.40 medium .27 .36 .46 .64
high .42 .55 .68 .92
(b) For Public Goods
demand elasticity for, and share of, tax-favored consumption
Labor tax rate labor supply
elasticity
0 low medium High
low .05 .10 .16 .29
medium .10 .16 .24 .39 0.32
high .16 .24 .33 .50
low .06 .11 .18 .31
0.36 medium .13 .19 .27 .43
high .20 .29 .39 .57
low .07 .12 .19 .33
0.40 medium .15 .23 .31 .48
high .25 .35 .46 .67
                                               
29 Also, it is easy to verify that if we adopted parameter values used by Ballard (1990) our results would be very
similar to those he obtained from a computable general equilibrium model with a uniform labor income tax (see
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When we allow for tax deductions our central estimate for the MEB for transfer
payments becomes 0.39--an increase of 77 percent--and the range of possible outcomes
becomes 0.15-0.92.30  At first glance, it may seem surprising that tax deductions make such a
large difference to the MEB, given that the markets for medical and housing services are
small in size relative to the labor market.  However the welfare impacts in these markets can
still be relatively important because the elasticity of response to tax changes in these markets
is much larger than in the labor market.  Our central estimate for the MEB for public goods is
0.27--about double the value in the absence of tax deductions--and the range of possible
values is 0.10-0.67.
Clearly, our results support Feldstein's (1995, 1999) insights about the empirical
importance of tax deductions for the MEB.  However, Feldstein (1999) obtains much higher
estimates for the MEB (for transfer spending)--typically in excess of unity.  We have
suggested some possible explanations for the differences in these results in the Introduction.
In addition, we note that estimates of the tax income elasticity based on how federal income
taxes respond to changes in federal tax rates incorporate additional spending on all of the
deductions listed in Table 1.  As discussed above, we think it is appropriate to exclude many
of these categories--in fact over 60 percent of them--although the deductions for investment
and savings would be relevant for a dynamic analysis.31
A striking, and troublesome, feature about Table 2 is the wide range of values for the
MEB under different plausible assumptions about parameter values.  It is not that much help for
someone doing a cost/benefit analysis of a government transfer program to learn that the extra
deadweight losses from financing the program could be anywhere between 15 and 92 percent of
dollar outlays.  We really need to attach some probabilities to these different outcomes to make
the results more practical.  To do this we now turn to some Monte Carlo simulations.
C. Monte Carlo Analysis
For these simulations we assume that possible outcomes for each parameter value are
uniformly distributed across the ranges we specified earlier.32  Our program picks a value at
random for each parameter from its distribution and calculates the resulting MEB using the
above formulas.  This process is repeated 10,000 times and the normal distributions that most
                                               
30 As noted above, Browning et al. (1997) prefers an alternative definition of the MEB that depends only on
compensated elasticities.  For this case, the range for the MEB would be .15-.1.17 with a central value of .43.
31 Ballard et al. (1985) estimated the MEB for public goods using a dynamic computable general equilibrium
model of the US economy.  Their treatment of the tax system incorporates deductions for housing and certain
capital assets, but not for medical services or fringe benefits.  They found that the MEB for payroll taxes was about
0.23 and for income taxes about 0.29.  The income tax is more distortionary because it distorts investment behavior
and biases spending in favor of housing--but the contribution of these factors is not decomposed in their analysis.
32 Assuming parameters are uniformly distributed (as opposed to, say, normally distributed) provides
conservative estimates of confidence intervals, for assumed parameter ranges.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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closely fit the resulting probability distributions are shown in Figure 1.33  In these graphs the
solid vertical lines indicate mean values and the dashed vertical lines indicate 1 and 2 standard
deviations from the mean.  Note that there is a 68 percent probability of a generated value
lying between –1 standard deviation of the mean, and a 96 percent probability of lying
between –2 standard deviations.
The upper and lower two graphs show probability distributions for the MEB without
and with tax deductions respectively.  Thus, from the top graphs we see that there is a 68
percent probability that the MEB for transfer payments lies between 0.16 and 0.28, and
between 0.08 and 0.17 for public goods, when tax deductions are ignored.  In the lower graphs,
where we properly account for tax deductions, the MEB for transfer payments lies between
0.31 and 0.48, and for public goods between .21 and .35, each with a 68 percent probability.
Of course we have only made our "best guess" about the ranges for the underlying
parameter values.  Nonetheless, given these ranges, the Monte Carlo exercises clearly help to
reduce uncertainty about possible outcomes for the MEB.
4. FURTHER DISCUSSION: NON-TAX DISTORTIONS IN MARKETS WITH
TAX-SUBSIDIES
In this section we briefly comment on non-tax factors that impinge on markets
receiving favorable tax treatment.34
Housing
Subsidies for home ownership have been justified on externality grounds.  For
instance, people tend to take better care of their property when they own it, and this provides
aesthetic benefits for other people in the neighborhood, besides increasing neighboring
property values.  In addition, homeowner subsidies can encourage new housing developments
and thereby alleviate problems of congestion, pollution concentrations, noise, and so on, as
people migrate out of densely populated inner cities.  Some studies have found some
empirical support for these types of externalities, though on balance the evidence is probably
fairly weak (see e.g. Rosen, 1985).  Moreover, there are external costs to housing
development, such as the destruction of nature.35
                                               
33 We used Analytica for these simulations.  We assume that parameter distributions are statistically independent.
This seems a plausible approximation for example the degree of substitution between individual consumption
goods is not obviously related to the overall degree of substitution between consumption and leisure.
34 For much more comprehensive discussions see for example Rosen (1985) on housing and Pauly (1986) and
Phelps (1992) on health care.
35 In any case, general housing subsidies are very blunt instruments to address any positive externalities.  Many
investments that homeowners undertake to improve their properties are inside the house, and therefore do not
really confer external benefits.  Even external improvements may have little externality benefits, if they are
undertaken by people living in more remote areas.20
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Housing subsidies have also been defended on the grounds that the average citizen
may gain utility when the poorest members of society increase their consumption of certain
"basic needs" goods (besides housing, these may also include food, education, and medical
care--see e.g. Harberger, 1984, for a discussion).  Mortgage interest tax relief is clearly ill-
suited for this purpose: many poor people live in rented accommodation, hence most of the
benefits from this provision "leak away" to the better off.  Instead, this basic needs externality
provides a possible justification for housing assistance programs.  The subsidy from these
programs amounted to a very substantial $27 billion in 1995--probably more than enough to
compensate for any externality.36
The market for housing services is also complicated by a number of other policy
interventions, though these are much less important in empirical terms than the tax subsidy.
On the one hand, such things as building codes, zoning laws, and rent controls are implicit
taxes on housing, while urban renewal programs and the public provision of roads, schools,
and other community facilities subsidize development.
Medical Services
The free market may provide a sub-optimal level of health insurance because of moral
hazard.  When insurance companies pay for expenses in the event of illness, the price of
treatment for the individual is zero rather than reflecting the marginal social costs of provision.
As a result people may demand a socially excessive amount of treatment, and may take less
care to avoid incurring medical expenses.37  These effects raise the costs of insurance, thereby
reducing coverage below economically efficient levels (i.e. some people do not receive any
health insurance at all, while others cut back on, for example, insurance for dental and eye
care).  The tax-subsidy may counteract this source of inefficiency--but the effectiveness is
dampened by the impact of higher demand on raising the average quality of health care, and
hence premiums (40 million people remain without health insurance, despite the tax subsidy).
Moreover, the tax-subsidy exacerbates the excessive provision of treatment for insured events,
and this can produce substantial welfare losses (Feldstein and Friedman, 1977).
There are some notable externalities associated with health care, but again they
operate in opposing directions.  In particular, when one person is treated for an infectious
disease this reduces the probability that other people will catch the disease.  On the other
hand, the more people use antibiotics, the greater the potential for new strains of diseases to
develop that are immune to current antibiotics.  The first externality may be the more
important, but in empirical terms is probably not that significant relative to total spending on
medical insurance.  Efficiency in the health care market is also complicated by implicit taxes
such as drug regulations and occupational licensing for health care providers, and additional
subsidies such as the Medicaid program.
                                               
36 This figure is from the Statistical Abstract of the United Sates, 1995, Table 520.
37 These perverse incentives are mitigated to some extent by deductions and co-insurance payments.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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In short, based on our understanding of the housing and health care literature, we draw
the following conclusions.  In principle, there are market failures that could justify some level
of tax-subsidy.  However it is difficult to quantify the optimal level of subsidies given the
existing evidence--and at any rate they are probably well below the rate of existing subsidies
from the tax system (41 percent for health, 31 percent for housing).  Moreover, there are some
negative externalities that serve to dampen the optimal subsidy (and possibly even reverse its
sign).  On top of this, matters are complicated by a whole array of additional regulations and
subsidies, and whether the net impact of these other policies is to increase or reduce the
optimal subsidy is unclear.  At any rate, we can make some crude estimate of how these
factors might affect the MEB using the formulas in Section 2.  Suppose, for example, that
there are net social benefits from health care equal to 20 percent of the market price, and
therefore neutralize half of the tax-subsidy.  This would reduce our central estimate of the
MEB for transfers from 0.39 to 0.35.
Charitable Contributions
We prefer not to include the tax deduction for charitable contributions in our MEB
estimates, since the subsidy may correct for positive externalities.  As already mentioned, the
provision of basic needs goods for the poor may confer consumption externalities that raise the
utility of the better-off, although there is not concrete evidence on this.  At any rate, if instead
we did include charitable contributions this would change our results by a fairly modest amount:
our central estimates for the MEB for transfer spending would rise from 0.39 to 0.42.38
5.   CONCLUSION
Estimating the economically efficient amount of expenditure on government programs
requires knowledge about the marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB).  This is the
efficiency cost from financing an additional dollar of government spending that arises from the
impact of incrementally higher taxes on the deadweight costs of the tax system.  Recent studies
have drawn attention to the importance of tax deductions for the MEB.  These deductions
effectively subsidize consumption goods that receive favorable tax treatment relative to other
consumption goods.  As a result, higher taxes on labor income induce efficiency losses by
aggravating distortions in the consumption bundle, in addition to aggravating distortions in the
labor market.
In previous work, Feldstein (1999) estimated the MEB using evidence on how peoples'
taxable income responds to changes in tax rates.  This paper uses an alternative "disaggregated"
approach that adds up the welfare impacts in markets for tax-favored goods and the labor
market.  Our approach is meant to be a complement, rather than a substitute, for earlier work.
In particular, it sheds light on the potential contribution of underlying parameters to the MEB,
                                               
38 This calculation assumes a price elasticity of demand for charitable contributions of unity (see Auten et al,
1999, for a recent discussion of the price elasticity), a tax-subsidy of 31 percent (contributions escape income
and sales taxes but not payroll taxes), and a share of labor income equal to 0.016 (from Table 1).Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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and explores the consistency of previous results with micro evidence about underlying
parameter values.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, we estimate that there is a 68 percent probability that
the MEB lies between 0.31 and 0.48 for government transfer spending, and between 0.21 and
0.35 for spending on public goods.  These estimates are substantially higher (about 70 percent
or more) than when we ignore the effect of tax deductions.  However they are somewhat
below the estimates obtained by Feldstein (1999).
There are a number of important qualifications to our results.  First, easily the two
most important tax deductions for our purposes are those for owner occupied housing and for
medical insurance.  As discussed above, our analysis ignores a number of non-tax factors that
affect the magnitude of the overall economic distortion in these markets.  Unfortunately, until
more evidence becomes available, it is difficult to quantify the net impact of these factors.
Second, there is a fair amount of uncertainty surrounding certain key parameter
values--namely labor supply elasticities, and the demand elasticity for owner occupied
housing and medical insurance.  We consider a wide range of values for these parameters, but
obviously our estimated "most likely" ranges for the MEB are sensitive to our assumptions
about where the underlying parameter distributions are centered.
Third, our analysis focuses purely on the impact of the tax system on distorting labor
supply and consumption decisions. In principle, an important extension for future research
would be to explore how the tax system distorts the consumption/savings decision and the
allocation of investments among different types of assets.  For this purpose, potentially
important tax deductions include those for pension contributions, accelerated depreciation of
physical capital, and the exemption of imputed income from owner occupied housing.
However, the key parameters for this extension--namely the consumption/savings elasticity
and the elasticity of demand for individual assets--are even more uncertain than the
underlying parameters in our static analysis.
Fourth, the analysis in this paper may have less importance for estimating the MEB in
other countries.  For instance, income tax deductions for mortgage interest and private
medical insurance have now been phased out in the United Kingdom.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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APPENDIX
CALCULATING THE AVERAGE RATE OF LABOR TAX
For this calculation we used figures from Tables B-28, -80, and -84 of the Economic
Report of the President (1998) and Table 500 of the Statistical Abstract of the United States
(1998).  In 1995 federal income tax revenues amounted to $590 billion and state income tax
revenues $138 billion.  These include revenues from taxes paid on capital as well as labor
income, though the effective contribution from capital is probably small.39  Revenues from
other labor taxes in 1995 included $659 from social security taxes and $312 billion from sales
and excise taxes.
We make some adjustment to social security taxes because they are offset to the extent
that higher current contributions lead to higher social security benefits in retirement.
However, since social security is a pay-as-you-go system, the base for funding is proportional
to the growth of the real wage base in the economy (which reflects growth in the labor force
and growth in average real wages).  We assume that the expected future growth in the real
wage base is 2 percent per year.  In contrast, if a dollar of savings for retirement were invested
in a typical retirement account the expected rate of return would be around 8 percent, based
on previous experience.  Thus, the effective tax per dollar of social security payments for a
worker is (1.02/1.08)
n, where n is the number of years to retirement.  Averaging over workers
with 10, 20, 30, and 40 years to retirement gives 0.3.  Currently, 81 percent of social security
taxes are linked to future income benefits, and 19 percent are used to finance Medicare.
Medicare benefits are not linked to a person's previous social security contributions.  Thus, we
assume that one dollar of current social security taxes yields a present value of additional
benefits of 24 cents (=0.81·30 cents); hence we assume the effective burden of social security
taxes is reduced to $501 billion.
Gross labor income was $3849 billion in 1995, which consists of wages, salaries, and
some fringe benefits.  To this we add sales and excise tax revenues, since these taxes are
borne by labor in our model and widen the gap between the marginal social benefit and
marginal social cost of labor.  Proprietary income also reflects some labor earnings, though
the amount is not decomposed in the data.  We follow Browning (1987) and assume that half
of the reported proprietary income in 1995 is labor income, which gives an additional $245
billion.  Employer social security taxes are also part of gross labor earnings.  These amounted
to one half of total social security payments ($330 billion) and we reduce this by 24 percent
because of the benefit offset, leaving $251 billion.  Thus we estimate effective labor income
as 3849+312+245+251 = $4657 billion.
                                               
39 First, many special provisions contained in the income tax system erode the revenues from capital income.
For example, the maximum rate of tax for capital gains income is 20 percent while that for labor income is 36
percent, and taxes are only paid on realized not actual gains.  Second, in a life-cycle context most of a typical
worker's future capital income results from savings out of labor income.  In this sense future taxes paid on
savings are effectively born by current labor income.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
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The average rate of labor tax is labor tax revenues over labor income, i.e. (590 + 138 +
501 + 312)/4684 = 0.33.  This can be decomposed into 12.7 percent for federal income taxes,
3.0 percent for state income taxes, 10.8 percent for social security taxes, and 6.7 percent for
sales and excise taxes.
CALCULATING THE MARGINAL RATE OF LABOR TAX
Due to the progressivity of the personal income tax system the marginal rate of tax
exceeds the average rate.  Feldstein (1998) uses a value of 24 percent for the marginal rate of
federal income tax for the average worker.  To apply this figure to our definition of labor
income--as opposed to pre-income tax household earnings--we multiply by (3849 + 245)/
(3849 + 245 + 312 + 251), which gives 21.1 percent.  Adding on the rate of state income tax
(3.0) gives 24.1.40
The social security tax is a proportional tax on wage earnings, except that the non-
Medicare component (81 percent of the tax) is zero above a threshold level.  In 1995,
6 percent of workers were above this threshold (Statistical Abstract, 1997, Table 585).  Thus
we calculate the marginal tax rate from the average tax rate (10.8) as: 10.8 – (0.81 · 0.06 ·
10.8) = 10.3.  Since sales and excise taxes are proportional the marginal rate equals the
average rate (6.7).  Adding up all these marginal tax rates gives 41 percent.
ADJUSTING THE TAX-SUBSIDY IN HOUSING FOR THE PROPERTY TAX
We calculate property tax payments by owner occupiers by dividing the revenue loss
from the income tax deduction for property taxes, $14.8 billion (see Table 1), by the marginal
rate of income tax, 0.24, which gives $61.7 billion.41  From Table 1 the value of housing
services is $57.9/.24 = $241.25.  When 50 percent of the property tax is distortionary, and
property taxes are deductible from income taxes, the net additional tax rate is given by
(.5-.24)(61.7/241.25) = .06.  Conversely, when the property tax is not distortionary, but is
deductible from income taxes, the net additional subsidy is -.24(61.7/241.25) = .06.
                                               
40 The marginal rate of state income tax is a little higher than the average rate due to income tax deductions,
although making this adjustment (if the data were available to do it) would not have a noticeable effect on our
overall labor tax figures.  Browning's (1987) tax estimates also includes the implicit tax on the labor supply of
low-income families due to the withdrawal of benefits (e.g. food stamps, Medicaid, and housing benefits) as
income rises.  However the empirical significance of this effect on the labor tax rate averaged across all workers
may not be that large, since only a minor fraction of workers receive benefits.
41 Using an estimate of total property tax revenues would overstate payments by homeowners, since property
taxes are also paid on rented housing and commercial real estate.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
26
REFERENCES
Aschauer, D. A.  1985.  "Fiscal Policy and Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review,
75, pp. 117-127.
Atkinson, Anthony A., and Nicholas H. Stern.  1974.  "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods,"
Review of Economic Studies, 41, pp. 119-128.
Auten, Gerald, and Robert Carroll.  1998.  "The Effect of Individual Income Taxes on
Household Behavior," Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
Auten, Gerald, Holger Sieg, and Charles Clotfelter.  1999.  Charitable Giving and Income
Taxation in a Life-Cycle Model: An Analysis of Panel Data, Discussion Paper, U.S.
Treasury, Washington D.C.
Ballard, Charles L.  1990.  "Marginal Efficiency Cost Calculations: Differential vs. Balanced-
Budget Analysis," Journal of Public Economics, 41, pp. 263-276.
Ballard, Charles L., and Donald Fullerton.  1992.  "Distortionary Taxation and the Provision
of Public Goods," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6, pp. 117-131.
Ballard, Charles L., John B. Shoven, and John Whalley.  1985.  "General Equilibrium
Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States," American
Economic Review, 75, pp. 128-138.
Browning, Edgar K.  1976.  "The Marginal Cost of Public Funds," Journal of Political
Economy, 84, pp. 283-298.
Browning, Edgar K.  1986.  "The Marginal Cost of Raising Tax Revenue," in Phillip Cagan,
ed., Essays in Contemporary Economic Problems (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute).
Browning, Edgar K.  1987.  "On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation," American
Economic Review, 77, pp. 11-23.
Browning, Edgar K.  1994.  "The Non-Tax Wedge," Journal of Public Economics, 53,
pp. 419-433.
Browning, Edgar K., Timothy Gronberg, and Liqun Liu.  1997.  Alternative Measures of the
Marginal Costs of Funds, Working Paper 9803, Private Enterprise Research Center,
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.
Carroll, Robert.  1998a.  Do Taxpayers Really Respond to Changes in Tax Rates, Working
Paper No. 78, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury, Washington, D.C.
Carroll, Robert.  1998b.  "Tax Rates, Taxpayer Behavior, and the 1993 Tax Act," paper
presented at the National Tax Association Meetings, Austin, Texas.
Feldstein, Martin.  1995.  "The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel
Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act," Journal of Political Economy, 103, pp. 551-572.Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
27
Feldstein, Martin.  1999.  "Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
Feldstein, Martin, and Bernard Friedman.  1977.  "Tax Subsidies, The Rational Demand for
Insurance and the Health Care Crisis," Journal of Public Economics, 7, pp. 155-178.
Feldstein, Martin, and Andrew Samwick.  1992.  "Social Security Rules and Marginal Tax
Rates," National Tax Journal, XLV, pp. 1-22.
Fuchs, Victor R., Alan B. Krueger, and James M. Poterba.  1998.  "Economists' Views about
Parameters, Values and Policies: Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics,"
Journal of Economic Literature, 36, pp. 1387-1425.
Fullerton, Donald.  1991.  "Reconciling Recent Estimates of the Marginal Welfare Cost of
Taxation," American Economic Review, 81, pp. 302-308.
Gruber, Jonathan, and James M. Poterba.  1994.  "Tax Incentives and the Decision to
Purchase Health Insurance," Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX, pp. 701-734.
Harberger, Arnold C.  1964.  "The Measurement of Waste," American Economic Review, 54,
pp. 58-76.
Harberger, Arnold C.  1984.  "Basic Needs versus Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit
Analysis," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 32, pp. 455-474.
Hoyt, William H., and Stuart S. Rosenthal.  1992.  "Owner-Occupied Housing, Capital Gains,
and the Tax-Reform Act of 1986," Journal of Urban Economics, 32, pp. 119-139.
Killingsworth, Mark R.  1983.  Labor Supply (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University
Press).
Kormendi, R. C.  1983.  "Government Debt, Government Spending and Private Sector
Behavior," American Economic Review, 73, pp. 994-1010.
Lindsey, Lawrence.  1987.  "Estimating the Behavioral Responses of Taxpayers to Changes in
Tax Rates: 1982-1984.  With Implications for the Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate,"
Journal of Public Economics, 33, pp. 173-206.
Lucas, Robert E.  1990.  "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review," Oxford Economic
Papers, 42, pp. 293-316.
Mayshar, J.  1991.  "On Measuring the Marginal Cost of Funds Analytically," American
Economic Review, 81, pp. 1329-1335.
Mirrlees, James A.  1994.  "Optimal Taxation and Government Finance," in John M. Quigley
and Eugene Smolensky, eds., Modern Public Finance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press).
Nakagami, Yasuhiro, and Alfredo M. Pereira.  1996.  "Budgetary and Efficiency Effects of
Housing Taxation in the United States," Journal of Urban Economics, 39, pp. 68-86.
Oates, Wallace E.  1994.  "Federalism and Government Finance," in J. Quigley and E. Smolensky,
eds., Modern Public Finance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).Ian W. H. Parry RFF 99-48
28
Parry, Ian W. H., and Antonio M. Bento.  1999.  Tax Deductible Spending, Environmental
Policy, and the "Double Dividend" Hypothesis, Discussion Paper 99-24, Resources for
the Future, Washington, D.C. (December 1998).
Pauly, Mark V.  1986.  "Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical
Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 629-675.
Phelps, Charles E.  1983.  Taxing Health Insurance: How Much is Enough?, Report P-6915,
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California.
Phelps, Charles E.  1992.  Health Economics (New York: Harper Collins).
Pigou, Arthur C.  1947.  A Study in Public Finance, Third edition (London: Macmillan).
Rosen, Harvey S.  1979.  "Housing Decisions and the U.S. Income Tax: An Econometric
Analysis," Journal of Public Economics, 11, pp. 1-23.
Rosen, Harvey S.  1985.  "Housing Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, and
Equity," in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public Economics,
Vol. 1 (New York: North-Holland).
Russek, Frank R.  1996.  Labor Supply and Taxes, Discussion Paper, Congressional Budget
Office, Washington, D.C.
Slemrod, Joel.  1998.  "Methodological Issues in Measuring and Interpreting Taxable Income
Elasticities," National Tax Journal, 51, pp. 773-788.
Slemrod, Joel, and Schlomo Yitzhaki.  1996.  "The Cost of Taxation and the Marginal
Efficiency Cost of Funds," IMF Staff Reports, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 172-198.
Snow, Arthur, and Ronald S. Warren.  1996.  "The Marginal Welfare Cost of Public Funds:
Theory and Estimates," Journal of Public Economics, 61, pp. 289-305.
Stuart, Charles.  1984.  "Welfare Costs per Dollar of Additional Tax Revenue in the United
States," American Economic Review, 74, pp. 352-362.
Triest, Robert K.  1998.  "Econometric Issues in Estimating the Behavioral Response to
Taxation: A Nontechnical Introduction," National Tax Journal, LI, pp. 761-772.
Wildasin, David E.  1984.  "On Public Good Provision with Distortionary Taxation,"
Economic Inquiry, 22, pp. 227-243.